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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a linear precoder for the downlink of a multi-user MIMO system with multiple
users that potentially act as eavesdroppers. The proposed precoder is based on regularized channel inversion
(RCI) with a regularization parameter α and power allocation vector chosen in such a way that the achievable
secrecy sum-rate is maximized. We consider the worst-case scenario for the multi-user MIMO system, where
the transmitter assumes users cooperate to eavesdrop on other users. We derive the achievable secrecy sum-
rate and obtain the closed-form expression for the optimal regularization parameter αLS of the precoder using
large-system analysis. We show that the RCI precoder with αLS outperforms several other linear precoding
schemes, and it achieves a secrecy sum-rate that has same scaling factor as the sum-rate achieved by the
optimum RCI precoder without secrecy requirements. We propose a power allocation algorithm to maximize
the secrecy sum-rate for fixed α. We then extend our algorithm to maximize the secrecy sum-rate by jointly
optimizing α and the power allocation vector. The jointly optimized precoder outperforms RCI with αLS and
equal power allocation by up to 20 percent at practical values of the signal-to-noise ratio and for 4 users and
4 transmit antennas.
Index Terms
Secrecy rate, physical layer security, precoding, multi-user communications, MIMO systems.
1I. INTRODUCTION
In current practical multi-user MIMO systems such as LTE and 802.11n, securing transmitted data
from nearby eavesdroppers is critical. In these systems, security is achieved using potentially vulnerable
network layer cryptography techniques. The vulnerability is due to a reliance on the limited resources of
the eavesdropper and on the unproven computational complexity of inverting the encryption algorithms
[1]. To enhance the protection of transmitted data and achieve perfect secrecy, methods exploiting the
channel, known as physical layer security, have been proposed.
Physical layer security techniques were proposed to protect the data from eavesdroppers for several
network topologies in [2]–[14]. In [2], [3], a three-terminal network consisting of a transmitter, an
intended user and an eavesdropper, known as the wiretap channel, was considered. The authors derived
the secrecy capacity, where the message is transmitted reliably to the intended user while the rate of
information leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes asymptotically with the code length. The secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel was derived for the MIMO case in [4]–[6] when all terminals had
full channel state information. It was shown in [7]–[11] that the transmission of artificial noise, as
well as adaptive encoding, is an effective method to reduce the eavesdropper’s signal-to-noise ratio
when the eavesdropper’s channel is not known by the transmitter. Recently, physical layer security was
also extended to multiuser networks where the eavesdropper is not an intended user [12], [13] and to
two-user networks where the intended users are also eavesdroppers [14]. The secrecy capacity region
for multi-user networks where any number of intended users are potentially eavesdropping remains
an open problem. Moreover, the achievable secrecy rates of such multi-user networks with practical
transmission schemes are also unknown.
Suboptimal precoding schemes have proven to be practical and effective in controlling interuser
interference for the downlink of multi-user MIMO networks [15]–[23]. While the sum-capacity of
multi-user MIMO networks without eavesdroppers is achieved using dirty paper coding [24], it requires
high-complexity coding schemes [25]. Linear precoding schemes were proposed as a low-complexity
alternative for multi-user MIMO downlink implementations [26]. A popular and practical linear pre-
coding scheme to control interuser interference is channel inversion (CI) precoding, sometimes known
as zero forcing precoding [15], [16]. To increase the sum-rate performance of the CI precoder, the
regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoder was proposed to tradeoff the interuser interference and the
2desired signal through a regularization parameter [17]. Linear precoding schemes were also proposed
to achieve secrecy in single-user MIMO networks [4]–[7].
In [27], the use of linear precoding was proposed to achieve physical layer security in a multi-user
MIMO system. For RCI precoding, the authors obtained an achievable secrecy sum-rate as a function
of the singular values of the channel. A bound on the optimal regularization parameter of the precoder
was also given in the large-system regime.
In this paper, we consider the multi-user MIMO downlink with multiple single-antenna users that
cooperate and jointly eavesdrop on other users, and we propose a linear precoder based on RCI. We
use large-system analysis with an approach different from that of [27], and we derive the optimal
regularization parameter αLS and the corresponding achievable secrecy sum-rate. Numerical results
confirm the accuracy of the large-system analysis, even when applied to a number of users as low as
4. Moreover, the RCI precoder with αLS outperforms several other linear precoding schemes. In fact,
it achieves a secrecy sum-rate that has same scaling factor as the sum-rate achieved by the optimum
RCI precoder without secrecy requirements. We then propose an iterative power allocation algorithm
to obtain the maximum secrecy sum-rate for fixed α. We extend our algorithm to maximize the secrecy
sum-rate by jointly optimizing the regularization parameter α and the power allocation vector. The
proposed power allocation algorithm outperforms RCI with αLS and equal power allocation (RCI-EP)
by up to 20 percent at practical values of the SNR and for 4 users and 4 transmit antennas.
Throughout the paper we use the following notation: bold uppercase (lowercase) letters denote
matrices (column vectors); (·)T and (·)† denote matrix transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively;
the trace of a matrix is denoted by tr{·}, and the Euclidean norm of a vector is indicated by ‖ · ‖;
E[·] denotes the expected value of the random variable in the brackets, CN (µ, σ2) denotes circularly
symmetric complex-Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, and we use the notation
[·]+ △= max(·, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a narrowband multi-user MIMO system, consisting of a base station
(BS) with M antennas which simultaneously transmits K independent confidential messages to K
spatially dispersed single-antenna users. Transmission takes place over a block fading channel, where
3the coherence time of the channel is much longer than one symbol interval. In this model, the
transmitted signal is x = [x1, . . . , xM ]T ∈ CM×1, and the received signal at user k is given by
yk =
M∑
j=1
hk,jxj + nk (1)
where hk,j ∼ CN (0, 1) is the fading gain between the j-th transmit antenna element and the k-th user,
and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the noise seen at the k-th receiver. The corresponding vector equation is
y = Hx+ n (2)
where H = [hk,j] is the K×M channel matrix, y = [y1, . . . , yK ]T and n = [n1, . . . , nK ]T . We impose
the long term power constraint E[‖x‖2] = 1, assume that E [nn†] = σ2I, and define the SNR ρ = 1/σ2.
The transmitted signal x is obtained at the BS by performing a linear processing on the confidential
messages uk, k = 1, . . . , K.
It is required that the BS securely transmits each confidential message uk, ensuring that the unin-
tended users receive no information. This is performed at the secrecy rate Rs,k, defined as follows. Let
Pr(En) be the probability of error at the intended user, m be a confidential message, yne be the vector
of all signals received by the eavesdroppers, and H(m|yne ) be the corresponding equivocation. Then
a (weak) secrecy rate Rs,k for the intended user is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nRs,k , n)
codes such that Pr(En)→ 0 and 1nH(m|yne ) ≤ 1nH(m)− εn with εn approaching zero as n→∞ [6].
In general, the behavior of the users cannot be determined by the BS. As a worst-case scenario, in our
system we assume that for each intended receiver k the remaining K−1 users can cooperate to jointly
eavesdrop on the message uk. For each user k, the alliance of the K − 1 cooperating eavesdroppers
is equivalent to a single eavesdropper with K − 1 receive antennas, which is denoted by k˜.
III. LINEAR PRECODING
In this section, we derive an achievable secrecy sum-rate for the multi-user MIMO downlink with
malicious users by using a linear precoder. Although suboptimal, linear precoding schemes are of
particular interest because of their low-complexity implementations and because they can control the
amount of crosstalk between the users [15]–[18]. We then specialize and obtain the secrecy sum-rate
achievable by the RCI precoder. RCI is a linear precoding scheme that was proposed to serve multiple
users in the multiuser MIMO downlink channel, which has better performance than plain channel
inversion, especially at low SNR [17].
4A. Preliminaries
In linear precoding, the transmitted vector x is derived from the vector containing the confidential
messages u = [u1, . . . , uK]T through a deterministic linear transformation (precoding) [15]–[18]. We
assume that the entries of u are chosen independently, satisfying E[|uk|2] = 1. We assume spatially
homogeneous users, i.e. each user experiences the same received signal power on average, thus the
model assumes that their distances from the transmitter are similar.
Let W = [w1, . . . ,wK ] be the M ×K precoding matrix, where wk is the k-th column of W. Then
the transmitted signal and the power constraint are, respectively:
x =
1√
γ
Wu =
1√
γ
K∑
k=1
wkuk, (3)
E
[‖x‖2] = 1
γ
E
[‖Wu‖2] = 1
γ
K∑
k=1
‖wk‖2 = 1, (4)
where γ = tr{W†W} is the long-term power normalization constant.
B. Achievable Secrecy Sum-Rates with Linear Precoding
By employing the linear precoding in (3), the signals observed at receivers k and k˜ are, respectively
yk =
1√
γ
h
†
kwkuk +
1√
γ
∑
j 6=k
h
†
kwjuj + nk
y
k˜
=
1√
γ
∑
k
H
k˜
wkuk + nk˜
(5)
where n
k˜
= [n1, . . . , nk−1, nk+1, . . . , nK ]
T
, h
†
k is the k-th row of H, and Hk˜ is a matrix obtained from
H by eliminating the k-th row. The channel in (5) is a multi-input, single-output, multi-eavesdropper
(MISOME) wiretap channel [6]. The transmitter, the intended receiver and the eavesdropper of this
MISOME wiretap channel are equipped with M , 1 and K − 1 virtual antennas, respectively. Due to
the simultaneous transmission of the K messages, user k experiences noise and interference from all
the uj , j 6= k.
In the following, we derive an achievable secrecy sum-rate Rs for the multi-user MIMO system
with malicious users. Although the design of codes for the multiuser MIMO channel with security
constraints is not the focus of this paper, we prove the achievability of Rs with a code construction
based on independent codebooks and linear precoding.
5Lemma 1 (Codebook construction): An achievable secrecy sum-rate Rs for the multi-user MIMO
system with malicious users is given by
Rs
△
=
K∑
k=1
Rs,k, (6)
where Rs,k is an achievable secrecy rate for the k-th MISOME wiretap channel (5), k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof: Assume that the BS uses independent codebooks for each user, where each codebook is
a code for the scalar wiretap channel [6]. The confidential message uk is obtained as a codeword
independently drawn from the code Ck, corresponding to the k-th user. The rate Rs,k of the code Ck is
chosen according to the secrecy rate achievable for user k in the presence of eavesdropper k˜, i.e. by the
secrecy rate achievable for the MISOME wiretap channel (5). The existence of such code is guaranteed
by the definition of secrecy rate [3]. To construct the vector codeword for the broadcast channel, the
scalar codewords for each MISOME wiretap channel are stacked according to u = [u1, . . . , uK ]T , and
no additional binning is required. The vector u is then linearly precoded as in (3), which means that
each message uk is transmitted by beamforming (i.e. signaling with rank one covariance) along the
direction wk. The secrecy sum-rate Rs is then by definition the sum of the simultaneously achievable
secrecy rates Rs,k.
Lemma 2: An achievable secrecy rate Rs,k for the MISOME wiretap channel (5) is given by
Rs,k =
[
log2
(
1 + SINRk
)
− log2
(
1 + SINR
k˜
)]+
, (7)
where SINRk and SINRk˜ are the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios for the message uk at the
intended receiver k and the eavesdropper k˜, respectively.
Proof: By noting that the MISOME wiretap channel (5) is a nondegraded broadcast channel [6],
the secrecy capacity is given by [3]:
Cs = max
uk→wkuk→yk,yk˜
I
(
uk; yk
)
− I
(
uk;yk˜
)
(8)
where I(x; y) denotes mutual information between two random variables x and y. The secrecy capacity
Cs is given by the difference of the mutual informations at the intended user and at the eavesdropper,
respectively. Cs is achieved by maximizing over all joint probability distributions such that a Markov
chain uk → wkuk → yk,yk˜ is formed, where uk is an auxiliary input variable. By evaluating (8) with
6uk ∼ CN (0, 1) and with the linearly precoded data wkuk, we obtain an achievable secrecy rate Rs,k
for the MISOME wiretap channel (5) given by
Rs,k =
[
I
(
uk; yk
)
− I
(
uk;yk˜
)]+
a
=
[
I
(
wkuk; yk
)
− I
(
wkuk;yk˜
)]+
, (9)
where (a) follows from wkuk being a deterministic function of uk [6]. Equation (7) then follows from
(9) and from the statistics of uk.
From equation (7) it is clearly observed that for high-performance linear precoder design an efficient
tradeoff between maximizing SINRk and minimizing SINRk˜ is required.
Theorem 1: A secrecy sum-rate achievable by multi-user MIMO linear precoding is given by
Rs =
K∑
k=1
[
log2
(
1 +
∣∣∣h†kwk∣∣∣2
γσ2 +
∑
j 6=k
∣∣∣h†kwj∣∣∣2
)
− log2
(
1 +
∥∥H
k˜
wk
∥∥2
γσ2
)]+
. (10)
Proof: By using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have that an achievable secrecy sum-rate is obtained
as the sum of the secrecy rates Rs,k in (7). A lower bound on the quantities Rs,k can be obtained by
considering a genie-aided eavesdropper which observes not only the signals y
k˜
received by its K − 1
antennas, but also all the confidential messages uj, j 6= k. Such channel clearly has an achievable
secrecy rate smaller than the original channel. The genie-aided eavesdropper k˜ can perform interference
cancellation, and it does not see any undesired signal term apart from the received noise n
k˜
.
According to the previous considerations, the signals at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper
of the k-th equivalent MISOME wiretap channel become, respectively:
yk =
1√
γ
h
†
kwkuk +
1√
γ
∑
j 6=k
h
†
kwjuj + nk
y
k˜
=
1√
γ
H
k˜
wkuk + nk˜
(11)
For the k-th equivalent MISOME wiretap channel in (11), the SINRs at the intended user and the
eavesdropper are, respectively:
SINRk =
∣∣∣h†kwk∣∣∣2
γσ2 +
∑
j 6=k
∣∣∣h†kwj∣∣∣2 , (12)
SINR
k˜
=
∥∥H
k˜
wk
∥∥2
γσ2
. (13)
7Since the noise in y
k˜
in (11) is spatially white, the optimal receive filter at k˜ is the matched filter
(H
k˜
wk)
†
. Equation (13) then follows. For a given channel H, substituting (12) and (13) into (7) and
then into (6) yields (10).
For the remainder of the paper, we refer to equation (10) as the secrecy sum-rate. We note that it
depends on the choice of the precoding matrix W, as well as on the channel H and the noise variance
σ2. A possible choice for W, based on regularized channel inversion, is discussed in the following.
C. Achievable Secrecy Sum-Rates with Regularized Channel Inversion
We now consider RCI precoding for the multi-user MIMO downlink with malicious users. Although
CI precoding can achieve secrecy by canceling all signals leaked at the unintended users, this comes
at the cost of a poor sum-rate. The RCI precoder has better performance than plain CI, particularly
at low SNR [17]. For each message uk, RCI precoding achieves a tradeoff between the signal power
at the k-th intended user and the crosstalk at the other (K − 1) unintended users for each signal. The
crosstalk causes interference to the unintended users. In the case when the unintended users are acting
maliciously, the crosstalk also causes information leakage. Therefore, RCI achieves a tradeoff between
signal power, interference, and information leakage.
With RCI precoding, linear processing exploiting regularization is applied to the vector of messages
u [17]. The RCI precoding matrix is given by
W = H†
(
HH† + αIK
)−1
. (14)
The transmitted signal x after RCI precoding can be written as
x =
1√
γ
Wu =
1√
γ
H†
(
HH† + αIK
)−1
u =
1√
γ
(
H†H+ αIK
)−1
H†u. (15)
The latter passes through the channel, producing the vector of received signals
y =
1√
γ
H
(
H†H+ αIK
)−1
H†u+ n. (16)
The function of the real nonnegative regularization parameter α is to improve the behavior of the
inverse, although it also produces non-zero crosstalk terms in (16).
Using RCI precoding, the SINRs (12) and (13) at the intended user k and the eavesdropper k˜ become
SINRk =
∣∣∣h†k (H†H+ αIK)−1 hk∣∣∣2
γσ2 +
∑
j 6=k
∣∣∣h†k (H†H+ αIK)−1 hj∣∣∣2 , (17)
8SINR
k˜
=
∥∥∥Hk˜ (H†H+ αIK)−1 hk∥∥∥2
γσ2
, (18)
where
γ = tr
{
H†H
(
H†H+ αIK
)−2}
. (19)
To simplify (17) and (18), we introduce the quantities
Ak = h
†
k
(
H
†
k˜
H
k˜
+ αIK
)−1
hk and (20)
Bk = h
†
k
(
H
†
k˜
H
k˜
+ αIK
)−1
H
†
k˜
H
k˜
(
H
†
k˜
H
k˜
+ αIK
)−1
hk. (21)
It is then possible to express (17) as [28]
SINRk =
A2k
Bk + γσ2 (1 + Ak)
2 . (22)
In a similar fashion, we rewrite (18) as
SINR
k˜
=
Bk
γσ2 (1 + Ak)
2 . (23)
By substituting (22) and (23) into (7) and then into (6) we obtain the following expression for the
secrecy sum-rates achievable with RCI precoding
Rs =
K∑
k=1
[
log2
(
1 +
A2k
Bk + γσ2 (1 + Ak)
2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Bk
γσ2 (1 + Ak)
2
)]+
. (24)
IV. LARGE-SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the performance of the RCI precoder in the large-system regime, where
both the number of transmit antennas M and the number of receivers K approach infinity in a fixed
ratio. We derive closed-form expressions for the optimal regularization parameter and the optimal
secrecy sum-rate achievable with RCI in the large-system regime. We then compare the secrecy sum-
rate achieved by the optimized RCI precoder to several other linear precoding schemes. Finally, we
evaluate the sum-rate loss due to the secrecy requirements. In this section, we focus on the case
K = M because the analysis for this case is more tractable, and it is considered to be most important
[17].
9A. Secrecy Sum-Rates in the Large-System Regime
We define ξ = α/K as the normalized regularization parameter, and note that as K → ∞, the
quantities (19), (20) and (21) converge (almost surely) to [28]
lim
K→∞
γ = g (ξ) + ξ
d
dξ
g (ξ) , (25)
lim
K→∞
Ak = g (ξ) , (26)
lim
K→∞
Bk = g (ξ) + ξ
d
dξ
g (ξ) , (27)
respectively, where
g (ξ) =
1
2
√
1 +
4
ξ
− 1
2
. (28)
By substituting the above expressions in (22) and (23), one can conclude that as K →∞, all the SINRs
at the intended user k and at the eavesdropper k˜ converge to a non-random function of the parameter
ξ and the noise variance σ2. Moreover, these quantities are the same for all confidential messages uk,
as K →∞. Hence, in the large-system regime, it is possible to write the secrecy sum-rate with RCI
precoder as
Rs ≃ Rs,∞ △= K
log2 1 +
ρg(ξ)2
[ρ+(1+g(ξ))2][g(ξ)+ξ ddξ g(ξ)]
1 + ρ
(1+g(ξ))2

+
, as K →∞. (29)
B. Selection of the Optimal Regularization Parameter
The value of the asymptotic secrecy sum-rate Rs,∞ in (29) depends on the normalized regularization
parameter ξ. We now derive the optimal value ξopt that maximizes Rs,∞.
Lemma 3: The optimal normalized regularization parameter in the large-system regime is given by
ξopt =
1
3ρ+ 1 +
√
3ρ+ 1
. (30)
Proof: The value of ξopt is obtained as the stationary point of the secrecy sum-rate Rs,∞, which
can be found by setting to zero the derivative of the logarithm in (29), by applying some algebraic
manipulations, and showing that the maximum value is nonnegative.
As in the case with no secrecy requirements, the value of ξopt is a function of the SNR ρ. In a
multi-user channel without secrecy requirements, the choice ξ = 1/ρ is optimal for large K, as it
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maximizes the sum-rate of the system [17]. However, this value is no longer optimal in a multi-user
channel with malicious users. In fact, because of the secrecy requirements the crosstalk terms appear
twice in the secrecy sum-rate expression (10). As a consequence, ξ = 1/ρ is too large and gives too
much crosstalk to the other users. This was proven in [27] and it is also easily confirmed by the
following inequality:
ξopt <
1
3ρ
<
1
ρ
∀ρ. (31)
Similarly to the case with no secrecy requirements, ξopt decreases as we increase ρ. The high-SNR
asymptote of ξopt is given by
ξopt ≃ 1
3ρ
, as ρ→∞ (32)
and ξopt tends to zero if ρ→∞.
Unlike the case with no confidentiality, the optimum normalized regularization parameter is upper
bounded and it does not tend to infinity as ρ tends to zero. The low-SNR asymptote of ξopt is
ξopt =
1
2
, for ρ = 0. (33)
In the remainder of the paper, we will denote by αLS = Kξopt the unnormalized large-system
regularization parameter.
C. Optimal Secrecy Sum-Rate
It is now possible to obtain an expression for the optimal secrecy sum-rate of the RCI precoder in
the large-system regime. The optimal secrecy sum-rate is a function of the SNR ρ and the number of
users K only.
Theorem 2: The optimal secrecy sum-rate RRCIs,∞ achievable by the RCI precoder in the large-system
regime is given by
RRCIs,∞
△
= max
ξ
Rs,∞ = K log2
9ρ+ 2 + (6ρ+ 2)
√
3ρ+ 1
4 (4ρ+ 1)
. (34)
Proof: Equation (34) is obtained by substituting (30) in (29) and applying some algebraic ma-
nipulations.
The secrecy sum-rate RRCIs,∞ in (34) satisfies
RRCIs,∞ > 0 ∀ρ > 0, (35)
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and the high-SNR asymptote of RRCIs,∞ is given by
RRCIs,∞ ≃
K
2
log2
27
64
+
K
2
log2 ρ, as ρ→∞. (36)
Therefore, in the large-system regime the secrecy sum-rate for optimal ξ scales logarithmically with
high SNR, and it scales linearly as K/2 with the number of users.
We have shown that although for K →∞ the number of eavesdroppers K−1 for each message tends
to infinity, a positive secrecy sum-rate is still achievable. This occurs because the number of transmit
antennas M = K also tends to infinity, and it is larger than the number of eavesdroppers. Therefore,
for each message the transmitter is able to control the amount of interference and information leakage.
We now compare the per-user secrecy rate achieved by RCI to the secrecy capacity of the MISOME
channel, CMISOMEs , in the high-SNR regime. The former is obtained by dividing (36) by the number
of users K, and it can be further approximated by
RRCIs,∞
K
≃ 1
2
log2 ρ, as ρ→∞. (37)
The value of CMISOMEs was obtained in [6], and it can be approximated by the following lower bound
CMISOMEs ≥
1
2
log2 ρ, as ρ→∞, (38)
which is tight at high SNR [6]. We note that in CMISOMEs from [6] a single-user system is considered.
Therefore, only one message is transmitted to one legitimate user, and the user does not experience
any interference. For large SNR, the RCI precoder achieves a per-user secrecy rate which is the same
as the secrecy capacity of a single-user system.
D. Comparison to Other Linear Schemes
In the following, we compare the secrecy sum-rate in (34) achieved by the RCI precoder with ξopt to
the secrecy sum-rates obtained from (29) by using: 1) ξ = 0 (CI precoder), 2) ξ →∞ (matched-filter
precoder) and 3) ξ = 1/ρ (optimum RCI precoder without secrecy requirements).
The aim of the CI precoder is to cancel all the interference and information leakage, therefore
yielding to a secrecy sum-rate that coincides with the sum-rate. We note that for the CI precoder it is
ξ = 0, and the precoding matrix is given by
W = H†
(
HH†
)−1
. (39)
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In order for the inverse in (39) to exist, it is required that K ≤M .
The secrecy sum-rate achieved by CI in the large-system regime grows at most sublinearly with
K →∞. In fact,
lim
ξ→0
lim
K→∞
Rs
K
= 0. (40)
This result is consistent with [28], where it was shown that the CI precoder performs poorly in the
large-system regime when the number of antennas equals the number of users.
Similarly, we calculate the secrecy sum-rate achieved when ξ →∞ (matched-filter precoding). Here,
the transmitter beamforms in a direction such as to maximize the signal strenght of each user, without
taking into account the interference it creates and the amount of resulting information leakage. The
secrecy sum-rate achieved by matched-filter precoding in the large-system regime is zero. In fact,
lim
ξ→∞
lim
K→∞
Rs
K
=
[
log2
2ρ+ 1
(ρ+ 1)2
]+
= 0. (41)
Clearly, matched-filter precoding performs poorly compared to the optimal RCI precoder. This is due
to the intended user suffering from a large amount of interference, while the eavesdroppers may cancel
the interference by cooperating.
Finally, we consider ξ = 1/ρ, which is the value that maximizes the sum-rate of the system without
secrecy requirements [17]. The secrecy sum-rate R◦s,∞ achieved by RCI with ξ = 1/ρ in the large-
system regime is given by
R◦s,∞ = K log2
4ρ+ 1 + (2ρ+ 1)
√
4ρ+ 1
2 (4ρ+ 1)
. (42)
We observe that the RCI scheme with ξ = 1/ρ outperforms the CI and the matched-filter precoding
schemes in the large-system regime, but it is suboptimal compared to the use of ξopt. For high SNR,
the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate gain provided by using ξ = ξopt in place of ξ = 1/ρ is given by
lim
ρ→∞
RRCIs,∞ − R◦s,∞
K
= log2
3
√
3
4
≈ 0.38 bits. (43)
E. Secrecy Loss
We now consider the secrecy loss, i.e. the sum-rate loss due to the secrecy requirements. We define
this as the difference between the optimal sum-rate R◦∞ without secrecy requirements and the secrecy
sum-rate RRCIs,∞ in (34). The sum-rate R◦∞ is obtained with RCI and ξ = 1/ρ, and it is given by [28]
R◦∞ = K log2
1 +
√
4ρ+ 1
2
. (44)
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The high-SNR asymptote of the sum-rate in (44) is
R◦∞ ≃
K
2
log2 ρ, as ρ→∞. (45)
For high SNR, the per-antenna secrecy loss is given by
lim
ρ→∞
R◦∞ −RRCIs,∞
K
=
1
2
log2
64
27
≈ 0.62 bits. (46)
By comparing (45) to (36), one can conclude that the secrecy requirements do not change the linear
scaling factor for large SNR. In other words, the RCI precoder with ξopt achieves a secrecy sum-rate
that has same scaling factor K/2 as the sum-rate achieved by the optimum RCI precoder without
secrecy requirements in [17]. The RCI precoder with ξopt can achieve secrecy with a penalty in terms
of the per-antenna sum-rate given by (46). The secrecy loss (46) corresponds to a power loss of a
factor 64/27 ≈ 3.75dB. Therefore, the RCI precoder with ξopt can achieve secrecy without reducing
the sum-rate of the system, as long as the transmitted power is increased by 3.75dB.
V. POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we consider power allocation for the RCI precoder. We first propose a new algorithm
to obtain the power allocation vector p which achieves the optimal secrecy sum-rate with a fixed
regularization parameter α. We then extend our algorithm to jointly optimize p and α.
A. Achievable Secrecy Sum-Rates
We consider the RCI precoding matrix with arbitrary power allocation given by
Wp = WD = H
†(HH† + αI)−1D, (47)
where D = diag(√p), and p = [p1, . . . , pK ]T is the power allocation vector. The vector p must be
chosen such that the power constraint tr
{
W†pWp
}
= 1 is met. Clearly, (47) generalizes the RCI
precoder W with equal power allocation (RCI-EP) in (14).
When the precoder Wp is used, the SINR at the k-th intended user, given by (12), becomes
SINRk =
pk|h†kwk|2∑
j 6=k pj|h†kwj|2 + σ2
, (48)
and the SINR at the eavesdropper k˜, given by (13), becomes
SINR
k˜
=
pk‖Hk˜wk‖2
σ2
=
pk
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
σ2
. (49)
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From (48) and (49), we obtain the achievable secrecy sum-rate with power allocation
RPAs =
K∑
k=1
[
log2
(
1 +
pk|h†kwk|2∑
j 6=k pj|h†kwj |2 + σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
pk
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
σ2
)]+
. (50)
B. Power Control
To obtain the optimal power allocation vector p, we are required to solve the non-convex optimization
problem
maximize
p
RPAs (p)
subject to tr{W†pWp} ≤ 1, (51)
where RPAs (p) is given by (50), Wp is given by (47), and the maximum total transmit power over
all antennas is one. In the following, we will ignore the notation [·]+ in (50) in the maximization
problem. In fact, any negative term in the sum can be replaced by zero (thus increasing the sum) by
using pk = 0 which is always feasible.
We now reformulate the problem (51) by applying the transformation p˜k = log pk, k = 1 . . . , K,
and obtain the optimization problem
maximize
p˜
RPAs (p˜)
subject to tr{W†pWp} ≤ 1, (52)
where p˜ = [p˜1, . . . , p˜K ]T .
Lemma 4: The second term of the objective function, RPAs (p˜), of (52) is concave.
Proof: The second term and its first and second derivatives are
− log2
(
1+SINR
k˜
)
= − log2
(
1+
ep˜k
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
σ2
)
,
−∂ log2
(
1 + SINR
k˜
)
∂p˜k
= − e
p˜k
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
σ2 + ep˜k
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
log2 e,
−∂
2 log2
(
1 + SINR
k˜
)
∂p˜2k
= − e
p˜k
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2σ2(
σ2 + ep˜k
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
)2 log2 e ≤ 0.
(53)
Hence, by the second order condition [30, §3.4.3] , − log2
(
1 + SINR
k˜
)
is concave.
In order to solve the problem (52), we consider a modified version of the method as in [29] and
[30] which is based on a reformulation of (52). This approach guarantees an improvement in the
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performance over the standard high-SNR approximation in fading channels [30]. In order to obtain
the reformulation, we use the following bound obtained in [29]
a log z + b ≤ log(1 + z), a = z0
1 + z0
and b = log(1 + z0)− z0
1 + z0
log z0, (54)
for some z0 ≥ 0, with equality when z = z0.
Lemma 5: With the change of variables p˜k = log pk, k = 1 . . . , K, the lower bound
ak
log 2
log
(
ep˜k |h†kwk|2∑
j 6=k e
p˜j |h†kwj|2 + σ2
)
+
bk
log 2
≤ log2
(
1 +
pk|h†kwk|2∑
j 6=k pj |h†kwj|2 + σ2
)
, (55)
is concave in p˜k, k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof: The result follows immediately using the method in Lemma 4.
We showed in Lemma 4 that the second term of (50) is concave by the second order condition. By
using the lower bound in (55) for the first term of (50), we obtain a concave objective function. Since
the constraints are affine, the optimization problem arising from (52) and the bound (55) is a convex
optimization problem. This convex optimization problem is given by
maximize
p˜
K∑
k=1
[
ak
log 2
log
(
ep˜k |h†kwk|2∑
j 6=k e
p˜j |h†kwj |2+σ2
)
+
bk
log 2
−log2
(
1+
ep˜k
∑
j 6=k |h†jwk|2
σ2
)]
subject to tr{W†pWp} ≤ 1
(56)
The power allocation vector can then be obtained using Algorithm 1 in Table I. To show that
Algorithm 1 converges monotonically to a local optimum, we note the constraint is the same for both
the t-th and (t+1)-th subproblems. Hence, the solution of the t-th subproblem (56) is also feasible for
the (t+1)-th subproblem (56). Moreover, by the bound in (54), the objective function is monotonically
increasing and converges to a local optimum.
C. Proposed Precoding Scheme
Having established an algorithm to determine the optimal power allocation vector p for a fixed α,
we now obtain our precoding scheme by considering the joint optimization of α and p. The joint
optimization problem can be written as
maximize
p,α
RPAs (p, α)
subject to tr{W†pWp} ≤ 1. (57)
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Even after using the transformation p˜k = log pk, k = 1, . . . , K, the problem (57) is non-convex. To
solve this problem, we propose Algorithm 2 in Table I.
At each iteration, Algorithm 2 optimizes the regularization parameter α and subsequently the power
allocation vector p. It is straightforward to prove that Algorithm 2 converges monotonically and it thus
provides with a locally optimal pair (α,p) for the proposed linear precoder. In Section VI we show
via simulations that the proposed precoder with jointly optimal regularization parameter and power
allocation vector outperforms RCI precoding with αLS and equal power allocation (RCI-EP).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we show the performance of our proposed precoding scheme via simulations. We also
consider the finite user scenario to show that many results from the large-system analysis in Section
IV hold for a small number of users. The precoding matrix W was normalized by √γ, as in (19), in
order to meet the power constraint in (4). This corresponds to a long-term power constraint, which
does not require the receivers to know the instantaneous value of γ [17]. In the following, we denote
by αLS = Kξopt the large-system regularization parameter, obtained from (30).
Fig. 1 compares the large-system regularization parameter αLS to the optimal regularization parameter
αFS for a finite number of users. The value of αFS was found by using single-variable numerical
optimization to maximize the mean value of the secrecy sum-rate in (24). The figure shows the finite-
system and large-system regularization parameters at practical SNR values for four different numbers
of users: 4, 8, 16 and 32. We observe that as the number of users K increases, the value of αFS
approaches the large-system regularization parameter αLS.
In Fig. 2 we demonstrate that using the large-system regularization parameter αLS in a finite-size
system does not cause a significant loss in the secrecy sum-rate compared to using a regularization
parameter αFS(H) optimized for each channel realization. The figure shows the complementary cu-
mulative distribution function (CCDF) of the normalized secrecy sum-rate difference between using
αLS and αFS(H) as the regularization parameter of the RCI precoder for K = 4, 8, 16, 32 users at
an SNR of 10dB. The difference is normalized by dividing by the secrecy sum-rate of the precoder
that uses αFS(H). We observe that the average normalized secrecy sum-rate difference is less than 2.4
percent for all values of K. As a result, the large-system regularization parameter αLS may be used
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instead of the finite-system regularization parameter with only a small loss of performance. Moreover,
the value of αLS does not need to be calculated for each channel realization.
Fig. 3 compares the analytical secrecy sum-rate of the RCI precoder in (34) to the simulated secrecy
sum-rate of the RCI precoder with a finite number of users, which is averaged over 103 channels. The
RCI precoder with a finite number of users was obtained by using the regularization parameter αFS,
found by simulation, that maximizes the average secrecy sum-rate. We observe that the large-system
analysis is accurate at low SNR for all values of K. Moreover as K increases, the large-system analysis
is accurate for larger values of the SNR.
In Fig. 4 we compare the simulated secrecy sum-rate of the RCI precoder using the large-system
regularization parameter αLS with CI precoding [15] and RCI precoding with α = K/ρ, which
maximizes the sum-rate without secrecy [17]. The sum-rate of the optimal RCI precoder without
secrecy requirements is also plotted. The figure shows plots for K = 4, 8, 16, 32. We observe that
CI precoding exhibits a large performance loss compared to the secrecy sum-rate of the optimal RCI
precoder for large values of K. The RCI precoder with α = K/ρ outperforms CI precoding, but it is
suboptimal compared to the RCI precoder that uses αLS. We note that although CI precoding achieves
secrecy in a simple way by completely canceling the information leakage, this comes at the cost of a
poor sum-rate. Secrecy can be achieved with a significantly larger sum-rate by using the RCI precoder
with αLS. We also observe that the secrecy loss between the sum-rate of the RCI precoder without
secrecy and the secrecy sum-rate of the RCI precoder is almost constant at high SNR for large K.
This confirms the result we derived in (46). Moreover, the value of the simulated per-antenna secrecy
loss is 0.59 bits for K = 32 and ρ = 25dB; close to the 0.62 bits suggested by the analysis in (46).
In Fig. 5 we compare the simulated per-user secrecy rate of the proposed precoder with jointly
optimized regularization parameter α and power allocation vector p to the RCI precoder with αLS
and popt, and to the RCI-EP precoder with αLS. We observe that there is a negligible performance
difference between the proposed precoder and the RCI precoder with αLS and popt. As a result, a low-
complexity, near-optimal RCI precoder may be implemented by using αLS and optimizing the power
vector separately. The figure shows that for K = 4, the proposed power allocation scheme always
outperforms the RCI-EP precoder with αLS by up to 20 percent, and the gain does not vanish at high
SNR. This occurs because at high SNR ξopt → 0 and the RCI precoder behaves as a CI precoder,
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for which the optimal power allocation is waterfilling [15]. Hence, equal power allocation for RCI is
suboptimal at high SNR. Fig. 5 also shows that the proposed power allocation scheme reduces the
sum-rate loss due to the secrecy requirements. For ρ ≥ 15dB, RCI with power allocation achieves
a per-user secrecy rate which is even higher than the per-user rate achieved by the optimal RCI-EP
without secrecy requirements. Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows the simulated secrecy capacity CMISOMEs of
a MISOME channel with the same per-message transmitted power. Although CMISOMEs is obtained
in a single-user and interference-free system [6], at high SNR, RCI with power allocation achieves a
per-user secrecy rate as large as CMISOMEs .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of secret communication in a multi-user MIMO system
with malicious users. We proposed a linear precoder based on regularized channel inversion (RCI)
with a regularization parameter and power allocation vector that maximize the achievable secrecy
sum-rate. The analysis presented in the paper, as well as the simulation results, showed that RCI with
equal power allocation (RCI-EP) and with the optimal regularization parameter outperforms several
other linear precoding schemes. Moreover, it achieves a sum-rate that has same scaling factor as the
sum-rate of the optimum RCI precoder without secrecy requirements. The secrecy requirements result
in a loss in terms of the sum-rate. This loss can be compensated by the proposed power allocation
scheme, which increases the secrecy sum-rate compared to RCI-EP.
Part of the analysis presented in this paper focused on the case when the number of users K equals
the number of transmit antennas M . Generalizing the results to the case when K and M can take any
value is part of our ongoing research effort. When K > M , the secrecy sum-rate degrades due to the
increased interference and information leakage. Therefore, it can be useful to design a user scheduling
algorithm that selects a subset of the users to be served, thus increasing their SINR. However, user
scheduling cannot reduce the number of potentially malicious receivers in the network, since discarded
users are still able to eavesdrop. The transmission of artificial noise can limit the eavesdropping ability
of the discarded users, but it must be harmless to intended receivers.
Throughout the paper, we focused on the worst-case scenario when the transmitter assumes that
users cooperate and jointly eavesdrop on other users. We are interested in this scenario because the
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transmitter is unable to predict whether the users are eavesdropping or not. Possible extensions of this
work include considering a scenario where only some of the users eavesdrop on other users, or where
users can individually eavesdrop, but without cooperating. In this case, the secrecy rate for each user
is limited by the eavesdropper that receives the largest information leakage. We leave the analysis of
these aspects for future work.
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Fig. 1. Comparison between the large-system regularization parameter αLS and the value αFS that maximizes the average secrecy
sum-rate for finite K.
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Fig. 2. Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the normalized secrecy sum-rate difference between using αFS(H)
and αLS with ρ = 10dB.
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Fig. 3. Comparison between the secrecy sum-rate in the large-system regime (34) and the simulated secrecy sum-rate for finite K.
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Fig. 4. Comparison between the RCI precoder with αLS and other linear schemes. The secrecy loss is also shown as the gap between
dashed and solid lines.
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Fig. 5. Per-user secrecy rate vs. ρ for K = 4 users: without power allocation (solid), with αLS and popt (dashed) and with joint
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TABLE I
PROPOSED ALGORITHMS FOR POWER ALLOCATION.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
Initialize iteration counter t = 0
Initialize all a(t)k = 1, b
(t)
k = 0
repeat
Solve (56) to obtain p˜(t)
Update a(t)k , b
(t)
k at z0 = SINRk(p˜
(t))
Increment t
until convergence
Obtain pk = ep˜k , k = 1, . . . , K
Initialize iteration counter t1 = 0, t2 = 0
Initialize pk = 1/γ, and set p˜k = log pk, k = 1, . . . ,K
Initialize α0 = Kξopt using equation (30)
repeat
Increment t1
Obtain α∗t1 using steepest descent with αt1−1 as initial point
Initialize all a(t2)k = 1, b
(t2)
k = 0
repeat
Solve (56) to obtain p˜(t2)
Update a(t2)k , b
(t2)
k at z0 = SINRk(α
∗
t1
, p˜(t2))
Increment t2
until convergence
Set p˜ = p˜(t2)
until convergence
Obtain pk = ep˜k , k = 1, . . . , K
